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Without a data base, unit commanders and training managers
in the U.S. Army are left to plan their training based on
what they perceive as their unit's weaknesses while analysis
agencies are helpless to assist in providing meaningful
direction to training efforts. With a data base drawn from
ARTEP or SQT type evaluations, analysis agencies could model
both the hardware parameters associated with equipment and
the human parameters associated with unit or individual per-
formance. Such modelling efforts could provide results which
would be helpful in measuring the cost effectiveness trade-
offs associated with various levels of unit or individual
training.
The purpose of this study is to explore what data should
be collected during Army training exercises in order to
facilitate analysis through combat models. More specifically,
this thesis will examine a Mechanized Infantry Platoon and
Squad in the Active Defense and recommend measures of per-
form.ance which are representative of the various functional
areas which make up the Active Defense. Data representative
of these measures of performance could then theoretically be
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I. BACKGROUND
Training in the United States Army can be classified as
either collective or individual. Collective training in the
Army has been based on the Army Training and Evaluation Pro-
gram (ARTEP) since 1975. On the other hand, individual
training has been based on the Skill Qualification Test
(SQT) since 1975. Both the ARTEP and SQT are performance
oriented evaluations in which standards are set and units
or individuals are evaluated on the basis of whether or not
the established standards are met. Little, if any, data
collection is actually performed in either the ARTEP or SOT
and what data are collected is done solely to support the
go/no-go evaluation of the unit or individual. Currently,
there are no provisions for retaining collected data for
future use by unit commanders , training managers or other
training analysis activities.
Without a data base, unit commanders and training mana-
gers are left to plan their training based on what they
perceive as their unit's weaknesses while analysis agencies
are helpless to assist in providing meaningful direction to
training efforts . With a data base drawn from ARTEP or SQT
type evaluations, analysis agencies could model both the
hardware parameters associated with equipment and the human
parameters associated with unit or individual performance.
Such modelling efforts could provide results which would be

helpful in measuring the cost effectiveness trade-offs asso-
ciated with various levels of unit or individual training.
Such analysis would help unit commanders establish their
training priorities in a logical and orderly manner, based
on analysis rather than perceived requirements. As a result,
training assets (men, money, and time) would be used in a
more cost effective manner. However, this can only be
achieved if a meaningful data base exists for analysis
agencies and unit commanders to work with.
The need for a data base developed from Army training
evaluations seems clear and indeed has been recommended by
a study conducted on the management of Army training. The
purpose of this thesis, however, is not to justify the need
for data collection in the Army. Rather, the purpose here
is to explore what data should be collected during Army
training exercises in order to facilitate analysis through
combat models. More specifically, this thesis will examine
a Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad in the Active
Defense and recommend measures of performance (MOPs) which
are representative of the various functional areas which
make up the Active Defense. Data representative of these
MOPs could then theoretically be used to accomplish analysis
of training alternatives as previously discussed.
Gerding, R. L. and George, D. P. , An Application of Or-
ganizational and Managerial Principles as an Improvement to
the Current Army Training and Evaluation Program for zhe
Mechanized Infantry
,




Chapter I of this thesis will explain and summarize how
Mechanized Infantry fights in the Active Defense and speci-
fically what is expected of a Platoon and Squad. Chapter II
will present a Flow Chart model of a Mechanized Infantry
Platoon in the Active Defense which identifies the tasks
that must be accomplished and the responsible individual (s )
.
Chapter III will, based on analysis of the Flow Chart model,
recommend MOPs which, it is felt, accurately reflect the
degree to which a Mechanized Infantry Platoon/ Squad accom-
plishes its assigned mission in the Active Defense. In addi-
tion. Chapter III will briefly examine the feasibility of
collecting data which is representative of the recommended
MOPs based on existing training evaluation procedures and
the findings of Gerding and George in their analysis of
ARTEP management.

II. CHAPTER I: HOW MECHANIZED INFANTRY
FIGHTS IN THE ACTIVE DEFENSE
A. INTRODUCTION
The defensive doctrine of the U. S. Army has undergone
a radical change in the last five years . This change has
been prompted by the realization that in all likelihood,
U. S. forces in any future conflict will be forced to fight
outnumbered. The proliferation of Threat forces, the in-
creased lethality of modern weapons systems , and experience
from the 1973 Mid-East War resulted in the adoption in 1976
of the Active Defense to replace the previous static defen-
sive doctrine of the U. S. Army. Before examining the
Active Defense more closely and determining what it requires
of a Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad, an overview of
how Threat forces attack will be presented.
B. HOW THREAT FORCES ATTACK
Threat doctrine stresses the offense as the main elem.ent
of combat and views the defense as a sometimes necessary
but always temporary phase of combat. The concentrations
of numerically superior forces and firepower for a combina-
tion of frontal attacks , enveloping maneuvers , and deep
offensive thrusts into the enemy rear by armor heavy com-
bined arms forces are the conceptual aims of the offense.
Threat offensive doctrine is designed to support rapid and

aggressive offensive action that visualizes 30-50 kilometer
2
advances per day m a conventional environment.
Threat forces emphasize two basic forms of maneuver: the
frontal attack and the envelopment. Envelopment is the pre-
ferred method of maneuver and is often conducted in conjunc-
tion with a frontal attack by forces of platoon size and
larger. In advancing to contact, Threat forces strive to
remain in column formation as long as possible to increase
the speed of the advance. If possible, battalions will not
deploy into battle formations until they are within 1 kilo-
3
meter of the objective."
Threat forces recognize three basic forms of offensive
action: the meeting engagement, which includes advance to
contact and hasty attack; the deliberate attack or break-
through; and the pursuit. The meeting engagement normally
follows an advance to contact and is characterized by actions
to seize and maintain the initiative. The attack is carried
out immediately from the line of march and may consist of a
frontal attack, envelopment maneuver or both. A hasty attack
is often an extension of the meeting engagement when pre-
pared positions are encountered and Threat forces have
located an assailable flank or gap in the defenses . During
a hasty attack, the Threat Motorized Rifle Company attacks
in line, usually behind an attached tank platoon and abreast
of other motorized elements . Speed is stressed in the attack
^Department of the Armiy , FM 7-7
,
p. 5-3, 19 7 7
^Ibid.
,
p. 5-5 - 5-7.

and riflemen remain mounted, fighting from their carriers,
unless absolutely forced to dismount. Defending forces are
destroyed or bypassed and mopped up by follow-on forces
.
If defending forces render a successful hasty attack im-
possible, Threat forces attempt to fix the defender for de-
14
ployment of additional forces into a deliberate attack.
The purpose of the deliberate attack or breakthrough is
to rupture forward defenses to allow the passage of exploi-
tation forces. The breakthrough operation is a frontal
assault against prepared defenses where no gap or assail-
able flank is available. The breakthrough is characterized
by the concentration of forces on a narrow front supported
by massive amounts of artillery. A Threat company is
assigned an immediate objective with a direction of further
attack and has as its mission the destruction of a specific
5defending unit and/or the seizure of a ground objective.
A Threat pursuit operation is intended to complete the
destruction of a defending unit. Instead of following a
retreating defender, Threat forces move on routes parallel
to his movement attempting to outdistance him, cut the
withdrawing column, and destroy the isolated element.
Threat forces in the pursuit move in column formation for
speed and bypass small pockets of resistance, trying to










the defender's route of withdrawal. The pursuit is initi-
ated at the first opportunity by regiment and higher head-




C. THE ACTIVE DEFENSE
With Threat forces employing numerically superior forces
and emphasizing such rapid, aggressive offensive techniques,
the U. S. Army has adopted a defensive doctrine known as the
xActive Defense to counter the Threat offensive doctrine.
The Active Defense requires defending units to engage the
enemy at maximum range, withdraw and re-engage the enemy
again at maximum range. Units become decisively engaged
only when higher commanders perceive that so doing is abso-
lutely critical to the success of the defense. These hit
and move tactics are designed to buy time and attrit the
enemy, while attempting to establish where the main enemy
thrust is going to take place to allow the concentration of
forces to block that attack. The battlefield for the Active
Defense is organized into three main areas : the Covering
Force Area (CFA); the Main Battle Area (MBA); and the Rear
Area (RA).
The CFA is located forward of the MBA and has four basic
objectives
.
•Force the enemy to reveal the strength, location,






the Covering Force (CF) seeks contact with the enemy
and engages with sufficient intensity to cause the
enemy to deploy and reveal his main attack.
•Deceive or prevent the enemy from determining the
strength, dispositions, and locations of friendly
forces in the MBA.
•Divest the enemy of his air defenses or at least cause
him to displace these forces before he attacks the MBA,
•Gain time for the main body to maneuver into and
7
prepare its defenses m the MBA.
Normally, armored cavalry units comprise the bulk of a force
in the CFA with attached tank, mechanized infantry, engi-
neers, artillery, and air defense units providing additional
support. The CF is structured so as to convince the enemy
that it has in fact met the main resistance of the friendly
forces. TanJc and mechanized infantry units used in the CF
will also normally be used later in the MBA. The CF fights
an indepth battle in the CFA attempting to achieve the four
objectives described earlier, withdrawing to the MBA after
a specified time period or on order of the CF commander.
The MBA lies behind the CFA and it is here that the main
battle will be fought. The farther forward the fight is
initiated in the MBA the better, allowing again for an in-
depth fight from a succession of pre-selected battle posi-
tions which provide the defender with maximum attainable
terrain advantage. The more penetration that the enemy
7





achieves into the MBA, the more likely a breakthrough will
be. However, the nature of the defense in the M3A is elas-
tic by design. The defense is centered around tanks and
Anti-Tank Guided Missies (ATGMs) and relies on their early
engagement of as many enemy tanks and personnel carriers as
possible over a series of relatively short periods of time.
When a commander has a "fire from mission" and perceives
that he has inflicted as much damage as possible from his
current battle position, he moves his unit (with his com-
mander's permission) to a subsequent battle position to be-
gin the engagement process all over again. Units located
in battle positions on extremely critical terrain may receive
"retain" missions which imply that they must be prepared to
repel an enemy assault against their battle position. Such
a mission is the exception rather than the rule because of
the "in-elastic" nature of such a mission and the obvious
danger of being bypassed.
The RA is the area behind the MBA from which supply and
maintenance support are projected forward to the units in
the MBA. Administrative echelons and communication centers
are also located here. Because the RA is generally out of
enemy artillery range, its main threat is from enemy air
attack and airborne/air assault attacks. Friendly air de-
fense units, airmobile infantry, and attack helicopter units
are employed to protect the RA. Emphasis is also placed in
the RA on concealment from air observation. However, large
tank and mechanized infantry forces cannot be reserved to
14

protect the RA. To a large degree, support units in the RA
are required to provide their own local security.
Thus, the Active Defense is what its name implies; a
highly mobile defense that engages the enemy as soon as and
as far forward as possible, followed by maneuvering to sub-
sequent battle positions to start the engagement process
over again. As the Active Defense progresses and the battle
takes shape, higher commanders maneuver elements to block
the enemy's main attack or shore up weaknesses in the MBA.
At all costs, penetration of the MBA's rear boundary is pre-
vented to preclude enemy breakthrough and pursuit operations
into the RA.
D. THE MECHANIZED INFANTRY PLATOON AND SOUAD
IN THE ACTIVE DEFENSE
The Mechanized Infantry plays a major role in the Active
Defense by contributing to the tank killing potential of the
force with their ATGMs and by providing close-in protection
for tanks and ATGMs againt dismounted infantry assaults by
the enemy. I'^/hile battalions and companies coordinate the
Active Defense, it is the platoon and, m.ore precisely, the
squad that actually fights the battle. It is for this reason
that the platoon and squad will be analyzed for tasks and
MOPs in this thesis. Before these tasks can be examined in
depth, it is important to understand the organization of the
Mechanized Infantry Platoon/Squad and what the Active Defense
requires of these units.
A Mechanized Infantry Platoon consists of four personnel
carriers; one carrier for the Platoon Leader (PL) and one
15

carrier for each of the three squads in the platoon. Since
the early 1960 's, the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier (APC)
has been the primary vehicle of the Mechanized Infantry.
The APC affords only limited armor protection for the squad
and has a .50 Caliber machinegun as its main weapon. It is
lacking in mobility and the squad cannot fight from the
vehicle with any degree of protection. The APC is soon to
be replaced by the Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) which is
a dramatic change from the APC. The IFV has increased mo-
bility and mounts a 2 5mm Bushmaster cannon as its main wea-
pon, along with a TOW missle launcher and a co-axially
mounted 7.6 2mm machinegun. This marked increase in fire-
power is mounted on a stabilized two man turret which greatly
enhances the effectiveness of these weapons. With a total
of six firing ports located on the sides and rear of the IFV,
the squad can now fight from their vehicle without exposing
themselves to the enemy. For the purpose of this thesis,
the IFV will be treated as the primary vehicle for the
Mechanized Infantry Squad. Figure 1-1 provides a detailed
description of the weapons available to a squad mounted on
the IFV. Figure 1-2 describes the proposed squad organiza-
tion for the IFV and interior configuration of the vehicle.
This is the organization which will be used for the Mechanized
Infantry Squad in this thesis
.
Mechanized Infantry Platoons/Squads fight the Active De-
fense through accomplishment of the following:
16

WEAPONS AVAILABLE TO THE IFV SQUAD
WEAPON DESCRIPTION
TOW The TOW is an optically sighted, wire
guided anti-tank weapon. The IFV
carries a TOW launcher that holds two
TOWs for firing. Additionally, up to
five more TOWs can be stowed in the
carrier itself. The TOW mounted on the
IFV can destroy tanks and personnel
carriers at ranges beyond 3000 meters.
It can be fired by either the IFV Com-
mander (Squad Leader or Platoon Leader)
or the Gunner.
Bushmaster The Bushmaster is a 25mm automatic
cannon which fires both High Explosive
(HE) and Armor Piercing (AP) ammunition.
The Bushmaster mounted on the IFV can
destroy personnel carriers using AP
ammunition at ranges beyond 2000 meters.
Using HE ammunition, it can kill or sup-
press personnel at similar ranges. The
Bushmaster has 300 rounds in the "ready"
position and 600 rounds in the "stowed"
position. The Bushmaster is considered
to be the primary weapon on the IFV and
like the TOW, it can be fired by the IFV
Commander or the Gunner.
COAX MG The COAX is a 7. 5 2mm machine gun which
is co-axially mounted with the Bushmaster
Used either as a spotting weapon for the
Bushmaster or against personnel in the
open, it has 800 rounds in the "ready"
position and lM-00 rounds in the "stowed"
position. It too can be fired by either
the IFV Commander or the Gunner.
M60 MG The H6 is a belt-fed, gas operated,
automatic machinegun which can be fired
from either an attached bipod mount or
a separate tripod mount. Effective at
ranges up to 500 meters for point targets
and 1100 meters for area targets, it is
fired by the Machine Gunner while dis-
mounted from the IFV. A total of 2 200
7.6 2mm rounds of ammunition for the M6





Dragon The Dragon is a man-portable , shoulder
fired, medium anti-tank weapon. The
Dragon consists of two major components:
a tracker and a round. The round, con-
sisting of the launcher and missle, is
expendable; the tracker is re-usable
and designed for fast, easy detachment
from the round. The Dragon can destroy
tanks and personnel carriers at ranges
between 65 meters and 1000 meters. It
is fired by the Dragon Gunner while dis-
mounted from the IFV. Up to five
Dragon rounds can be stowed on the IFV.
Dual Purpose Weapon... The Dual Purpose V/eapon consists of the
M20 3 M-Omm grenade launcher attached to
a M16A1 rifle. The grenade launcher
is a single shot, breach loaded weapon
which fires a variety of ammunition.
It has the ability to penetrate armor
plating and bunkers, suppress or kill
personnel, illuminate, and signal depend-
ing upon the choice of amjnunition
.
Primarily used to neutralize and suppress
targets that are in dead spaces of
gracing fire weapons, it is effective at
ranges up to 350 meters against area
targets and 200 meters against point
targets. It is fired by the Grenadier
while dismounted from the IFV. Infor-
mation on the M16A1 rifle is presented
below.
LAW The LAW ( Light Anti-Tank Weapon ) is a
self contained weapon consisting of a
5 6mm HEAT (xHigh Explosive Anti-Tank)
rocket. It weighs only 5.2 lbs. but
can defeat more than 2 centimeters of
armor plating. Used against tanks,
personnel carriers, and bunkers, it is
effective at ranges up to 200 meters.
The carrying case is disposable and is
destroyed after using. There are three
LAWs stowed in an IFV. There is no
designated gunner for the LAW; rather,
all members of the squad are required




M16A1 Rifle The M16A1 rifle is a 5.56mm weapon
which is magazine-fed, gas operated
and shoulder fired. It can be fired
from either the automatic or semi-
automatic mode. Both 2 and 30 round
magazines are available for the M16A1.
It is effective at ranges up to 350
meters. All personnel in the IFV
squad (except the M50 Machine Gunner)
are armed with the M16A1. A total of
2150 5.56mm rounds are stowed on the
IFV.
Firing Port Weapon. ... The Firing Port Weapon is a 5.5omm
rifle mounted inside the IFV. Two are
located on either side of the IFV and
two are located on the rear of the IFV.
Used primarily in offensive action dur-
ing a mounted assault, the Firing Port
Weapon gives the squad the ability to
engage targets while protected inside
the IFV. All squad members except the
Driver, Gunner, and Squad Leader man
the Firing Port Weapons. A total of
1800 rounds are in the "ready" position
and an additional 2200 rounds are
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•Destroying the enemy in designated sectors of fire
with TOW, 3ushmaster, Dragon, LAW, and machinegun
fire, supplementing the fire of tanks and other
ATGMs
.
•Repelling mounted attacks on avenues of approach
which cannot be adequately covered with ATGM and
tank fire.
•Repelling dismounted infantry assaults.
•Protecting ATGMs and tanks from enemy infantry,
especially when visibility is limited.
•Constructing obstacles to slow or canalize the enemy.
Within a battle position, the platoon's IFYs are located
so as to provide the opportunity to engage the enemy with TOW
and Bushmaster at the longest possible range. IFVs are
located in either "hull down" firing positions or "hide"
positions. Hull down firing positions afford a covered and
concealed location from which the IFV can fire its weapons,
thus minimizing the exposure of the super structure of the
IFV to the enemy. Wlien such a position does not exist, the
IFV is placed in a covered and concealed hide position with
an observer located in a forward firing position. V/hen the
observer spots a target, he calls the IFV forward, the target
is engaged, and the IFV returns to its hide position. Dis-
mounted infantry are positioned to provide the best protec-
tion for IFVs , tanks , and ATGMs against dismounted infantry
assaults. With the Dragon and LAW, dismounted infantry also
have the ability to kill enemy tanks and personnel carriers
at ranges up to 1 kilometer. This capability is also given
21

careful consideration when dismounted infantry are positioned.
These positioning considerations often require that the dis-
mounted squad and the IFV be in different locations, but not
so far apart that rapid movement out of the battle position
cannot be accomplished.
There are three basic types of fighting positions in a
battle position; primary fighting positions (PFPs), alternate
fighting positions (AFPS), and supplemental fighting positions
(SFPs). Mounted and dismounted PFPs are located to cover the
unit's primary sector of fire. AFPs also cover the unit's
primary sector of fire and are occupied when PFPs (or other
AFPs) become untenable. SFPs are located to cover a unit's
secondary sector of fire. Dismounted infantry will normally
have one PFP, one SFP, and at least one AFP. IFVs will nor-
mally have one PFP, one SFP, and at least two AFPs. Movement
from a PFP to an AFP allows a unit to remain in a battle
position and fire into its primary sector of fire even though
its PFP may be receiving effective fire from the enemy.
Movement to an SFP is made to counter an attack from a direc-
tion other than the primary one anticipated when the fighting
positions were initially sited.
The aggressive tactics of the enemy, the highly mobile
nature of the Active Defense, and the wide variety of weapons
available to the Mechanized Infantry Platoon/Squad present a
formidable challenge to the Platoon Leader and the Squad
Leader, and represent a complex set of tasks which must be
accomplished. Precisely what these tasks are and how they
fit into the Active Defense is the topic of the next Chapter.
22

III. CHAPTER II: A FLOW CHART IIODEL OF MECHANIZED
INFANTRY IN THE ACTIVE DEFENSE
A. INTRODUCTION
As already discussed, the Mechanized Infantry Squad
equipped with the IFV in the Active Defense must fight a
mobile battle, constantly striving to engage the enemy at as
long a range as possible. The purpose of this Chapter is to
determine the specific tasks that must be accomplished by a
Mechanized Infantry Platoon/ Squad during the course of an
Active Defense battle. However, before these tasks are
delineated, the methodology used to identify them will be
explained.
B. METHODOLOGY
The methodology used to identify the tasks required of
a Mechanized Infantry Platoon/ Squad was to flow chart the
activities of a Platoon/Squad in the Active Defense. In so
doing, it was possible to identify specifically what tasks
had to be accomplished and which personnel were responsible
for a given task. In flow charting the Active Defense, the
intent was to develop a general model which would consider
all possible tasks and courses of action. The Flow Chart
model was not intended to prioritize tasks nor develop a
specific sequence of occurrence for tasks.
Within the flow chart itself, six symbols are used.
These symbols and an explanation of their meanings are
23

presented in Figure 2-1. Figure 2-2 explains the abbrevia-
tions that are used throughout the flow chart. The most im-
portant symbol used in the flow chart is the square which
represents a task. The person (s) responsible for a given
task is identified in the lower right hand corner of the
respective square. Development of the flow chart was based
on current Army doctrine for the Active Defense as described




and FM 7-7 . An Army Research Insti-
tute study [Ref. 9] concerning the tasks required of an IFV
crew was also a primary reference for the development of the
flow chart.
C. THE FLOW CHART MODEL OF THE ACTIVE DEFENSE




•Consolidate or Move Out of Battle Position
Each of these Phases has a number of Components or functional
areas associated with it. These Components are broken out
among the three Phases as follows:
Occupy Battle Position Phase
•Move to Battle Position
•Move into Battle Position
•Prepare Fighting Positions
• Create Obstacles








Component on the Master
Coordination Symbol. All Tasks leaving
this symbol occur simultaneously. All
Tasks coming into this symbol must be
complete before any Task can leave. Some
are numbered or lettered for reference
purposes
.
Task Connectors. Arrows indicate direc-
tion to next Task.
Administrative Symbol. Used to control
the flow of Tasks and/or answer questions
generated by the Tasks.
<N Page Connector. Identifies Task Connec-tors that are split between pages.



























































































































































































































TRP Target Reference Point
TRVL.OW Travelling Overwatch








•Continue to Prepare righting Positions
•Prepare Future Battle Positions
•Conduct Sustaining Operations
Engage Enemy Phase
•Engage Enemy Long Range (greater than 25 meters)
•Engage Enemy Mid Range (1000-2500 meters)
•Engage Enemy Short Range (less than 1000 meters)
Consolidate or Move Out of Battle Position Phase
• Consolidate
• Move Out of Battle Position
Figure 2-3 is a Master Chart of the three phases of the Ac-
tive Defense and their associated Components. Each Component
represents a separate flow chart which specifically develops
the tasks associated with that Component. In addition to
these Component flow charts , a number of Sequences were de-
veloped separately. These Sequences represent a series of
tasks which occur repeatedly throughout the flow charts
.
These Sequences are presented separately in an attempt to
simplify the Component flow charts. These Sequences include:
























































• M60 Machinegun Sequence
•Dual Purpose Weapon Sequence
•COAX Machinegun Sequence
• Indirect Fire Sequence
•Movement to Dismounted AFP/SFP Sequence
• Movement to Mounted AFP/SFP Sequence
The 15 Component flow charts and IM- Sequence flow charts
which represent the Mechanized Infantry Platoon/ Squad in the
Active Defense are listed in Appendix A. Figure 2-4 contains






























Move to Battle Position






Continue to Prepare Fighting Positions
Prepare Future Battle Positions
Conduct Sustaining Operations
Engage Enemy Long Range
Engage Enemy Mid Range
Engage Enemy Short Range
Consolidate
























Figure A-2'+ M6 Machine gun




Figure A-2 7 Indirect Fire
Figure A-2 8 Movement to Dismounted AFP/SF?
Figure A-29 Movement to Mounted AFP/SFP
Figure 2-4 (continued)
/
IV. CHAPTER III: RECOMMENDATIONS
AND CONCLUSIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The flow charts presented in Appendix A reveal the rela-
tionship of tasks and decisions which, when taken together,
comprise the Active Defense. The purpose of the Flow Chart
model, as mentioned earlier, was to identify those critical
tasks and decisions which significantly influence unit per-
formance in various functional areas (Components and Sequences)
so that data could be collected to assist a combat modeller
in representing these functional areas . Before reviewing
the recommended MO?s , an explanation of the "ground rules"
for their selection is appropriate.
B. SELECTION CRITERIA FOR MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE
In the context of the Flow Chart model, a measure of
performance can best be defined as an indicator which reflects
the degree to which prescribed Com.ponents and Sequences are
accomplished. They are ideally, but not always, quantifiable
and they should directly relate to the Component/ Sequence in
question. The com.bat modeller is interested in MOPs which can
serve as, or support, input parameters to a model. The model
produces output in the form of pre-determined measures of
effectiveness (MOEs ) which enable the modeller and decision
maker to make conclusions about the system in question. For
the purpose of this thesis, the "system" was a Mechanized
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Infantry Platoon/ Squad and the MOPs sought were measures
which represent this system's performance in the Active
Defense
.
In analyzing the Components and Sequences of the Flow
Chart model for MOPs, the following criteria were used:
• The riOP had to have a significant impact on the
Platoon/Squad's ability to accomplish the objective of the
Component/ Sequence under consideration.
•The MOP had to be of interest to a combat modeller
trying to model the Component/ Sequence in question.
If a MOP could not meet these two criteria, it was nor re-
commended. It is important to mention that no considera-
tion was given to the "measurability " of the MOP, i.e.,
could data in fact be gathered which would be representative
of the MOP. This topic was beyond the scope of this thesis
and should constitute the next step in this research effort.
The purpose here was to simply identify those MOPs, within
the guidelines mentioned, which represent the performance
of a Mechanized Infantry Platoon/ Squad in the Active Defense
The MOPs identified can generally be classified as re-
presenting either time, accuracy or decision criteria. Time
and accuracy are variables which are generally quantifiable;
decision criteria, on the other hand, are not readily quanti-
fiable but of no less importance to the combat modeller.
Because of the multitude of decisions required in an Active
Defense battle, many of the recommended MOPs fall into this
category. Whereas time and accuracy can generally be
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represented numerically (time to engage, missed distance,
etc.), decision criteria are normally described by a list
of factors influencing the decision which, in turn, may be
weighted to reflect their relative importance. For example,
a decision criteria for route selection could be composed
of those factors used in selecting a route (range of enemy,
terrain, vegetation, available intelligence, etc.) and their
relative importance obtained through sampling of those
Platoon/Squad members involved in making such decisions.
With this type of information, the combat modeller will be
in a much better position to represent the dynamic action
inherent in operations such as the Active Defense.
C. RECOMMENDED MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE
The recommended MOPs are presented in this section by
Component/Sequence category as described in the Flow Chart
model. v^ere appropriate, a brief comment concerning the
Component/Sequence or recommended MOP(s) follows the listing
of the recommendations. In particular, MOPs which do not
fall into one of the three major categories previously men-
tioned will be discussed.
COMPONENT: Move to Battle Position
•Time required for a Squad Leader to issue an order
to his Squad.
•Decision criteria for selection of a movement technique
•Decision criteria for action (seek cover or continue
to move) when receiving indirect fire.
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The indepth nature of the Active Defense results in the ap-
pearance of this Component repeatedly throughout a battle.
Although the Sequences referenced in this Component provide
additional MOPs, the three listed above should also receive
consideration by a combat modeller because of their impact
on the overall performance of the Platoon/Squad.
COMPONENT: Move Into Battle Position
•Time required for a Platoon Leader and his Squad
Leaders to conduct a dismounted reconnaissance of a battle
position
.
•Decision criteria for selection of mounted and dis-
mounted primary fighting positions.
•Decision criteria for selection of primary and
secondary sectors of fire for the dismounted Squad and the
IFV.
•Time required to position a Platoon in a battle posi-
tion when the enemy is in range and when the enemy is not
in range.
The last MOP listed above may be the most significant in
this Component. The degree to which a Platoon can or cannot
perform in this area will greatly influence its ability to
engage the enemy as far forward as possible.
COMPONENT: Prepare Fighting Positions
•Time required for a Squad to dig fighting positions
with overhead cover and without overhead cover.
•Percentage of fighting positions in a Platoon size
battle Dosition that are visible from various ranges in
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front of the battle position and from the air.
• Time required to clear fields of fire.
•Time required to camoflauge mounted and dismounted
fighting positions.
•Decision criteria for selection of mounted and dis-
mounted alternate fighting positions and supplemental fight-
ing positions.
The ability of a Platoon to prepare its fighting positions
will directly influence its survivability in the battle and,
as a result, the eventual outcome of the battle. In particu-
lar, the presence of overhead cover has been shown to be of
major importance to the survival of dismounted infantry re-
ceiving the volume of indirect fire that can be expected
gfrom Threat forces. Because of this, these MOPs are seen
as critical in any effort to model Mechanized Infantry in
the Active Defense.
COMPONENT: Create Obstacles
•Decision criteria for site selection (including size
and density) for claymore mines, hasty minefields, and vjire
obstacles
.
•Percentage of claymore mines and hasty minefields
visible from inspection of the obstacle site (from enemy's
s i de ) .
•Distribution of error in recording claymore mine and
hasty minefield locations.
Chaudrue , R. G. (LTC), "Requiem for the Infantry,"
Infantry Magazine
,
p. 29, May-June 1978.
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•Decision criteria for employment of claymore mines,
hasty minefields, and wire obstacles.
•Time required to camoflauge claymore mines, hasty
minefields, and wire obstacles.
COMPONENT: Prepare Fire Plan
•Decision criteria for selection of final protective
lines for M16A1 and M6 Machine aun firers
.
•Decision criteria for selection of primary and
secondary sectors of fire for dismounted weapons
.
•Decision criteria for the selection of target refer-
ence points
.
•Percentage of actual deadspace in a Squad sector
that is identified and covered by indirect fire.
Of all the Components in the Flow Chart model. Prepare Fire
Plan may be of least interest to a modeller concerned with
the Mechanized Infantry Platoon/Squad in the Active Defense
because fire planning (especially indirect fire) is nor-
mally controlled and organized at Company and higher levels.
However, determination of deadspace is of importance to
the planning of fires and the Squad and Platoon are the
level at which the deadspace is found and reported to Com-
pany and higher levels for use in indirect fire planning.
Consequently, the combat modeller should not totally ignore
this Component of the Active Defense.
COMPONENT: Establish Security
•Decision criteria for employment of unattended ground
sensors (UGS), trip flares (TFs), commo wire, and observation
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posts - listening posts (OP-LPs).
•Decision criteria for the selection of sites for UGS,
TFs , and OP-LPs.
•Time required to camoflauge UGS and TFs.
•Percentage of UGS and TFs visible from inspection of
a site (from enemy's side).
•Time required for a Platoon to establish a communica-
tions hot loop.
•Time required for a Squad member(s) to emplace UGS
and TFs
.
• Tim.e required for a Squad to establish an OP-LP.
COMPONENT: Maintain Security
•Percentage of UGS and TF activations that are not
detected
.
•Distribution of operator error in pinpointing a
target location resulting from an UGS activation.
•Time required for a Platoon to man its fighting posi-
tions when told to do so.
This Component, as well as its predecessor, is important
because it often determines the range at which the enemy is
initially engaged. Because of this
,
unit commanders tradi-
tionally emphasize this Component and modellers must be able
to represent its affect on the combat outcome
.
COMPONENT: Continue to Prepare Fighting Positions
•Decision criteria for digging in wire, providing
overhead cover, digging trenches between fighting positions,




•Time required for a Squad to dig trenches between dis-
mounted fighting positions.
• Time required for an IFV to be dug in.
COMPONENT: Prepare Future Battle Positions
•Decision criteria for determining the order of prepara-
tion for future battle positions.
Although Platoons and Squads are involved in this Component,
the particular MOP listed above is usually a decision which
is made at a higher level. Nevertheless, the combat modeller
should have access to information influencing this decision
during the Active Defense at the Platoon/ Squad level.
COMPONENT: Conduct Sustaining Operations
•Time required for a Driver to perform first echelon
maintenance on an IFV.
•Time required for a Squad to clean its dismounted
weapons
.
•Time required for a Gunner to clean a Bushmaster.
•Reliability of weapons and IFVs.
•Percentage of weapons and IFVs that fail to operate
because of poor operator maintenance or cleaning.
The fourth MOP concerns the reliability of weapons and the
-IFV when they are in the hands of troops . The fifth MOP
concerns the number of malfunctions of weapons and IFVs
that can be attributed to poor operator maintenance or
cleaning. These are both very valuable MOPs to a combat
modeller but they are also extremely hard to measure. The
fifth MOP in particular would require knowing why a vehicle
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or weapon failed to operate in order to determine if the
operator was responsible.
COMPONENT: Engage Enemy Long/Mid/ Short Range
•Decision criteria for the re-call of an OP-LP.
• Decision criteria for moving a Squad to a dismounted
supplemental fighting position.
•Decision criteria for moving a Squad to a dismounted
alternate fighting position.
•Decision criteria for moving an IFV to a supplemental
fighting position.
•Frequency with which an attacker can pinpoint a de-
fender's firing position.
•Distribution of aim error of an attacker given than
the defender has been pinpointed.
•Decision criteria for occupying dismounted fighting
positions
.
The decision criteria for moving an IFV to an alternate
fighting position is not mentioned here because it falls
under the TOW SEQ and 3xMSEQ. The fifth and sixth iMOPs listed
above concern an attacker's ability to pinpoint a defender's
position as a result of the defender firing from his position
Combat models usually allow for visual acquisition and "pin-
point" detections. Pinpointing involves the location of a
position as a result of muzzle blast, firing signature, noise
or any other signature effect produced by the firing of a
weapon. This phenomena is particularly important with the
TOW and Dragon because of their pronounced firing signatures.
44

The combat modeller must have some type of information with
which to model the pinpoint type of acquisition and these
two MOPs are intended to provide that information. The lasr
MO? listed above is not specifically addressed in the Flow
Chart model. While doctrine generally states that the Squad
will always prepare fighting positions, precisely when, dur-
ing the course of a battle, the Squad occupies these posi-
tions is not clear. Such a decision is likely a function of
unit mission, range of the enemy, and the dism.ounted Squad's
ability to contribute to the battle. This MOP is included
because of the need to model this aspect of the Active Defense
COMPONENT: Consolidate
•Time required to redistribute ammunition within a
Squad.
COMPONENT: Move Out of Battle Position
•Time required for a dismounted Squad to mount an IFV.
•Miss distance with firing port weapons against moving
and stationary targets (IFV moving and stationary).
• Range of the enemy when movement out of a battle posi-
tion is initiated.
The first MOP listed above includes the time required for the
IFV to move to the pick up point where the dismounted Squad
will mount. Although not mentioned above, the combat modeller
is concerned with the decision criteria for moving out of a
battle position. This is largely mission and situation de-
pendent and is a decision made at Company level or higher.
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SEQUENCE: Mounted Movement (MMSEQ)
•Time required for an IFV to move to a specific loca-
tion, a specified distance away.
Frequency with which a specific destination is not
reached by mounted movement due to navigational error
(within a prescribed tolerance).
•Decision criteria for the selection of a mounted
route
.
SEQUENCE: Dismounted Movement (DMSEQ)
•'Time required for a Squad member to move to a speci-
fic location, a specific distance away.
•Frequency with which a specific destination is not
reached by dismounted movement due to navigational error
(within a prescribed tolerance).
•Decision criteria for the selection of a dismounted
route
The first MO? listed above would serve to show the driver's
contribution to the movement time of a vehicle. Combat
models that have movement routines use very detailed data
(vehicle specifications, soil traf ficability , slope speeds,
etc.) to compute movement times. The first MOP would pro-
vide a means of determining what the driver does or does not
contribute to the movement time of the vehicle.
SEQUENCE: Communication (CSEQ)
• Time required to send a message by wire, radio,
messenger, and visual signal.
•Time required for a radio transmission.
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• Frequency with which a message is not understood when
sent by wire, radio, messenger, and visual signal.
• Frequency with which communication cannot be estab-
lished by wire, radio, and messenger.
Virtually every Component and Sequence in the Flow Chart
model contains at least one CSEQ. If a Platoon/Squad cannot
communicate in the Active Defense, its ability to contribute
to the battle will be greatly reduced. Little is currently
known about the communications process within a Platoon/
Squad. A better understanding of the above MOPs and their




•Time required for a Squad member to acquire a target,
given that intervisibility exists.
• Percentage of time that a Squad m.ember engages an in-
feasible target, as described below.
•Time required for a Squad member to identify a target,
given acquisition.
•Frequency of search by a Squad member for a given
sector.
The MOPs listed above concern all members of a Squad because
at one time or another, they all go through this Sequence.
For obvious reasons though, these MOPs are more critical for
the Squad Leader and Gunner (and Observer in the case of an
IFV hide position) because they fire the TOW and Bushmaster,
or influence it in the case of an Observer. An infeasible
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target is operationally defined to be a target which is
thought to be in range for a particular weapon but actually
is not. For example, if a Gunner tries to engage an enemy
tank at 4-000 meters, the tank is considered to be an in-
feasible target. Although shown in this Sequence within the
Flow Chart model, the task concerning target selection when
multiple targets are available is discussed under the various
weapon Seq^uences .
SEQUENCE: TOW (TOW SEQ)
•Time required for an Observer to call an IFV forward
from a hide position and pass off the target. (This MOP is




•Decision criteria for target selection when more than
one TOW target is available.
•Hiss distance of TOW against moving and stationary
targets
.
•Time required to re-arm the TOW launcher (one and two
rounds )
•Number of rounds fired by a TOW before displacement.
•Decision criteria for moving an IFV to an alternate
_fighting position. (This MOP is also applicable to, but not
listed under, the Bushmaster Sequence.)
• Decision criteria for re-engaging a TOVJ target that
has already been missed.
•Sensing error involved in determining if a target has
been hit by a TOW firing.
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Because of the firing "signature" of a TOW, the MOPs concern-
ing what constitutes an untenable fighting position and
multiple engagements are very important to the combat modeller,
Sensing error, mentioned in the last iMOP, concerns the
firer's ability to determine if he has hit a target. This
is not peculiar to the firing of a TOW and is mentioned in
several other Sequences. The difficulty in making this de-
termination varies from weapon to weapon. This is a very
realistic MOP which grows in importance as the number of
targets and clutter on the battlefield increase.
SEQUENCE: Bushmaster ( 3MSE0
)
• Time required to re-load a Bushmiaster (3M) with AP
and HE ammunition.
•Sensing error involved in determining if a target
was hit by a^ 3M firing (with both AP and HE ammunition).
•Miss distance of center of burst for BM firing HE
ammunition against moving and stationary targets (IFV moving
and stationary).
•Miss distance of 3M firing AP ammunition against
moving and stationary targets (IFV moving and stationary).
•Number of bursts fired with a 3M from a given fight-
ing position before displacement.
•Decision criteria for target selection when both
mounted and dismounted BM targets are available.
•Decision criteria for re-engaging a BM target that
has already been missed.
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SEQUENCE: Light Anti-Tank VJeapon (LAW SEQ)
•Time required for a Squad member to place a LAW in
operation.
•Miss distance with the LAW against moving and sta-
tionary targets,
•Decision criteria for re-engaging a LAW target that
has already been missed.
•Decision criteria for target selection when more than
one LAW target is available.
•Number of LAWs fired from a specific fighting position
before displacement.
• Sensing error involved in determining if a target was
hit by a LAW.
SEQUENCE: Dragon (Dragon SEQ)
• Time reaj-iired for a Dragon Gunner to remove the Dragon
tracker from a used missle and place it on a new missle.
•Miss distance with a Dragon against moving and sta-
tionary targets.
•Decision criteria for target selection when more than
one Dragon target is available.
•Number of Dragon rounds fired before displacement.
• Sensing error involved in determining if a target was
hit by a Dragon firing.
SEQUENCE: M6 Machine gun (M5 SEQ)
• Miss distance of a burst from a M6 machine gun against
moving and stationary targets.





•Decision criteria for target selection when more than
one M60 target is available.
• Number of bursts required to hit a target.
• Time delay between the signal for final protective
fire (FPF) and the firing of the M60 FPF.
• Sensing error involved in determining if a target was
hit by a M6 machinegun burst.
SEQUENCE: Dual Purpose Weapon ( DPW SEQ)
•Miss distance of M2 3 Grenade Launcher against moving
and stationary targets.
•Hiss distance of M15A1 against moving and stationary
targets
.
•Time required to re-load the M20 3 and the M16A1.
•Time delay between the signal for FPF and the firing
of the M16A1 FPF.
•Decision criteria for target selection with both the
M2 3 and M16A1 when m.ore than one target is available.
• Sensing error involved in determining if a target
was hit by a M20 3 firing and a M15A1 firing.
SEQUENCE: COAX Machinegun (COAX SEQ)
•Number of spotting rounds required before Bushmaster
is fired.
•Decision criteria for using the COAX as a spotter for
the Bushmaster.
•Miss distance of a COAX burst against moving and sta-
tionary targets (not as a spotter).
•Sensing error involved in determining if a target was
hit by a COAX burst.

SEQUENCE: Indirect Fire (IDF SEQ
)
• Number of adjusting rounds required for a Platoon
Leader to bring indirect fire on moving and stationary-
targets .
•Time delay between the initial fire request and the
impact of the first round.
•Time delay between impact of the first round and
impact of fire for effect.
•Decision criteria for target selection when more than
one target is available for indirect fire.
All of the MOPs listed above are not entirely attributable
to the Platoon Leader (or person calling in fire). However,
the fact that parts of these MOPs involve the performance
of the direct support field artillery Battery does not
diminish their importance to the combat modeller.
SEQUENCE: Movement to Dismounted Alternate Fighting
Position or Supplemental Fighting Position
(MVMT TO DMTD AFP/ SEP)
•Time required for a dismounted Squad to move to an
AFP/SFP (moving together and separately).
•Range of enemy when move to AFP is initiated.
•Decision criteria for determining if a dismounted
-Squad moves together or separately to an AFP/SFP.
•Time of exposure of a dismounted Squad during a move
to an AFP/SFP.
SEQUENCE: Movement to Mounted Alternate Fighting
Position of Supplemental Fighting Position
(MVMT TO MTD AFP/SFP)
•Time required for an Observer to mount an IFV from
his observation point.

•Time required to move an IFV to and position it in
an AFP/SFP.
•Range of enemy when move to a mounted AF? is initiated.
D. CONCLUSION
In their thesis [Ref. 5] Gerding and George proposed,
among other recommendations, an Evaluator/Controller system
which was primarily aimed at improving the effectiveness of
ARTSP evaluaTions . However, they also realized an opportunity
to gather data at little or no increase in required support
resources. The measures of performance which such data
should represent are those described in the preceding section.
The purpose of this section is to examine the feasibility of
gathering this data wirhin the constraints of current and
proposed evaluation procedures. For an indepth review of
these procedures, the reader is referred to the aforementioned
thesis and ARTE? 71-2 [Ref. 2].
Among the recommendations made by Gerding and George was
a proposal that ARTE? evaluations be conducted in two phases
;
an on-line phase and an off-line phase. The off-line phase
would consist of various evaluations of small unit elements
down to crew level. These evaluations would involve the use
of firing ranges, REALTRAIN, and other similar training aids
and facilities. The on-line phase of the ARTEP evaluation,
separated by three or four days from the off-line phase, would
be composed of a scenario sequence which the evaluated unit
V70uld be required to accomplish. The off-line/on-line concept
of ARTEP evaluation is very adaptable to data collection. As

Gerding and George point out, the off-line phase, by neces-
sity, would have a large number of Evaluators/Controllers
per evaluated unit. Considering this high density, it cer-
tainly seems reasonable to expect that the Evaluators/Con-
trollers could gather data during the course of their small
unit evaluations. In addition, virtually all of the evalua-
tions that would occur in an off-line phase involve elements
of Platoon size and smaller ... precisely those levels at which
much of the data representative of the recommended MOPs would
have to be collected. As a result, the off-line phase of an
ARTEP evaluation appears to present an excellent opportunity
for gathering a considerable amount of data on the recommended
MOPs (such as firing of weapons) with little, if any, increase
in resource requirements or changes to evaluation procedures.
On the other hand, the scenario nature of the on-line phase
of an ARTEP evaluation is such that extensive data collection
may not be feasible, as it may unduly burden the Evaluators/
Controllers and disrupt the flow of the tactical sequence.
However, it may be possible for Evaluators/Controllers to col-
lect data on some selected HOPs , such as those pertaining to
Platoon or Squad movement between fighting positions, times
required to dig positions, and other similar MOPs which should
ideally be measured in the course of a tactical scenario. It
should be emphasized that a minimum of data collection should
be attempted during the on-line phase of the evaluation to
prevent disruption of the scenario.
As for information concerning decision criteria, such
data could be collected through several methods. A post-

evaluation questionnaire could be given to selected Platoon/
Squad members immediately after the on-line phase while
decisions which they made during the tactical exercise are
still fresh in their minds. An alternative would be to ad-
minister questionnaires or interviews totally separate of
any type of tactical evaluation.
There are two problems associated with collecting data
from an ARTEP evaluation either as it is currently conducted
or as envisioned by Gerding and George. First, some of the
recommended MOPs would require instrumented firing ranges
which are, in general, not readily available to mosT units
in the Army . Such ranges exist but they are primarily used
for experimentation and testing. Indeed, the recomjnended
MOPs in this thesis may assist planners in determining range
requirem.ents for the Army's proposed National Training Center.
Second, some of the recommended MOPs are derived from tacti-
cal operations not represented in the ARTEP 71-2. For
example, there is no established evaluation which is conducive
to collecting data representative of the MOP concerning a
Platoon Leader's ability to call indirect fire. Thus, in
some instances, it may be necessary to extend the tactical
coverage of the current ARTEP.
SOT evaluations provide another opportunity for data col-
lection. Some of the recommended MOPs concern the ability
of a single soldier to perform a certain task (land navigate,
emplace trip flares, emplace claymore mines, etc.) that in-
volve no requirement for firing ranges or information
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concerning decision criteria. Data representative of such
MOPs could conceivably be collected during SQT evaluations
without any change to current procedures. Indeed, some of
this data is already collected but used only to support the
go/no-go evaluation of the given task.
In general, the collection of data representative of
the recommended MOPs seems compatible with current SQT and
ARTEP evaluation procedures as suggested b3/ Gerding and
George. As mentioned, some changes to facilities and tasks
to be evaluated would undoubtedly have to be made in order
to collect some of the desired data. However, the Evaluator/
Controller structure of SQTs and ARTEPs is such that data
collection is possible, with little or no increase in re-
quired resources.
As stated previously, the purpose of this thesis was to
identify certain MOPs and related data which could be
collected during Army field training exercises, tests, and
evaluations for use in combat and training analysis. Such
MOPs for the Mechanized Infantry Platoon/ Squad in the Active
Defense have been identified and described through the use
of the Flow Chart model presented in Chapter II and
Appendix A. Based on a review of these selected MOPs, it
was concluded that, with few exceptions, the necessary data
to describe these MOPs could be collected in conjunction
with existing ARTEP and SOT evaluation procedures.
However, this work constitutes only the first of several
steps necessary to accomplsih the ultimate objective of pro-
viding useful data for more effective decision making. l-Jhat
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ultimately is needed is a comprehensive data collection, and
maintenance plan, which should be the focus of continuing
research in this area. Such research should be directed
towards the following:
•The systematic identification of MOPs for other
tactical ground and air operations of interest.
• The development of specific data collection plans for
each of the MOPs identified.
•The establishment of a mechanism for insuring that
data describing the selected MOPs are properly collected,
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